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Abstract
Promoting a theory with a finite number of terms into an effective field
theory with an infinite number of terms worsens simplicity, predictability, fal-
sifiability, and other attributes often favored in theory choice. However, the
importance of these attributes pales in comparison with consistency, both obser-
vational and mathematical consistency, which propels the effective theory to be
superior to its simpler truncated version of finite terms, whether that theory be
renormalizable (e.g., Standard Model of particle physics) or nonrenormalizable
(e.g., gravity). Some implications for the Large Hadron Collider and beyond are
discussed, including comments on how directly acknowledging the preeminence
of consistency can affect future theory work.
Lecture delivered at Wuppertal University for the physics and philosophy conference
“The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider”, 26-28 January 2012.
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1 Introduction
One of the most interesting questions in philosophy of science is how to determine
the quality of a theory. Given the data, how can we infer a “best explanation” for the
data. This often goes by the name “Inference to Best Explanation” (IBE) [1, 2, 3].
The wide variety of claims for important criteria are a measure of how difficult it is
to come up with a clear and general algorithm for choosing between theories. Some
claim even that it is intrinsically not possible to come up with a methodology of
deciding [5, 6]. Nevertheless the goals of IBE are worthy, and the payoff is high
upon increased understanding, if for no other reason than the extraphilosophical
importance of distributing grant money more fairly to researchers. Furthermore,
whether objective criteria for IBE are possible, all practitioners of science have no
choice but to engage in the “infer” part even if they may never touch upon the “best
explanation” part of IBE.
The goal of this article is to survey theory choice criteria in the context of effective
theories. It has been accepted by the physics communities that theories must be
“effectified”, that is they must be augmented to include all possible interactions
consistent with the stated symmetries to all orders. On the surface the resulting
effective theories are in conflict with the rules of IBE, whether they be the murky
rules that some physicists put forward when they talk about theory choice, or the
precisely stated rules developed by philosophers. Upon closer inspection effective
theories rise quickly to the top in theory choice when admitting to the primacy of
consistency in theory choice. That is the claim, to be developed below. The reader
should be warned that I will use the acronym IBE to mean any attitude, theory,
system by which people decide that one theory is a better description of nature than
another, or that a theory under consideration is a good theory at all.
2 The Standard Model’s Triumphs and Woes
This article is primarily written from the science perspective of elementary parti-
cle theory, with particular emphasis on the subfield “beyond the Standard Model
physics”. In this subfield, the task is to look out over nature and ask what is not
adequately described by the Standard Model (SM) of particle physics. The Standard
Model has been with us for about 40 years. It consists of three families of up-type
quarks (u, c, t), three families of down-type quarks (d, s, b), three families of leptons
(e, µ, τ) and three families of neutrinos (νe, νµ, ντ ). These interact with each other
according to gauge field theory interactions, mediated by the force carrier bosons
3
of the photon, gluons and W and Z bosons. Every particle that has mass is said
to achieve it by a condensing Higgs boson. For a more complete non-technical or
technical description of the SM see refs. [7] and [8] respectively.
The SM is a renormalizable theory and can be fully described on one page using
standard nomenclature of mathematics and relativistic quantum field theory. Despite
that simplicity, it can account for every measurement ever made at high-energy
colliders. It is an enormous human achievement. So why are there researchers
searching for theories “beyond the SM”? There are many reasons, of which I will
name a few:
• There are non-collider observations we still cannot explain such as galactic
rotation measurements that imply the existence of dark matter, and the pre-
ponderance of baryons over anti-baryons in the universe.
• The particle content and the three gauge forces cry out for unification (e.g.,
grand unified theories)
• There are many of parameters with large hierarchies that beg for explanation
(mt/me > 10
6).
• The SM Higgs boson appears unstable to quantum corrections and is thus
unnatural.
• Surely there is more than just the SM (e.g., SM is just copies of stuff in our
bodies).
• Embedding gravity into quantum mechanics is a severe challenge and should
bring new implications to the particle physics world (e.g., string theory)
Thus, there are many opportunities to devise new theories that solve one or more of
these problems. The theories are necessarily speculative upon birth. They are put
to the test, and the simple fact is that at any given moment there are a multitude
of theories that appear to be able to solve one or more of the issues. We have many
variants of supersymmetric theories, strongly coupled theories, extra dimensional
theories, etc. that appear to be able to do the job and are not yet distinguishable by
currently known data. How does a scientist determine which is the best? The rules
are not clear, of course, and we shall first ask how do scientists make theory choices,
and when does IBE enter their calculus.
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3 Theory Choice among Practitioners
Typically a particle physicist will look at the SM problems listed above and set
out to construct a new theory that explains one or more of them. The particle
researcher often stumbles into a theory choice of what to work on not based on IBE
but rather DBO (deduction of best opportunities). The opportunities that arise may
include matching yourself with the best PhD advisor who is working on theory X,
researching a fashionable topic to get a good job, supporting a clever theory that
the researcher devised that might not have high probability of being correct but has
highest probability of enormous personal pay-off, etc. The last reason then circles
back on the first reason as advisors ask their students to work on theories that they
themselves devised. Furthermore, the subtleties of elementary particle physics and
beyond the SM theories are such that it could take new practitioners years before
they feel confident that they could make a reliable IBE estimate even if the criteria
for such were clear to them. Thus, IBE considerations are often not the dominant
force for their theory choice (i.e., what to work on) in a practicing scientist’s career.
IBE issues do arise when there is competition among researchers for journal
space, research funds, and conference time slots. IBE-like arguments ensue. Words
used to describe the evaluation of theories are familiar to philosophers: simplicity,
economy, calculability, compatibility with data, testability, falsifiability, naturalness,
finetuning, predictivity, unification, no ad hoc assumptions, etc. Researchers become
attorneys for their theories and weight the various IBE criteria which most favorably
supports the direction of their research lines. That is why experimentalists and phe-
nomenologists emphasize “falsifiability” and “observational consistency” much more
than string theorist, who emphasize “unification”, “completeness” and “mathematical
consistency”.
It is often said at the end of arguments between theorists about their pet theories
that “experiment will decide”. However, as experiments become larger and costs grow
steeply, the time frame may extend well past decades to even centuries. It took more
than 25 years for CERN to conceive and build the LHC, for example. There is no
guarantee that any timeline convenient to a human is relevant to future experimental
construction. However, what is relevant to human time scales is deciding what are
“better” or “best theories”, since we should use that to allocate resources of time,
money, etc. Working toward perfecting IBE criteria, no matter how controversial
they are, is clearly warranted.
The recent universal acclaim of effective theories gives us an opportunity to apply
IBE thinking to a case that is not controversial as a means to better understand the
weight that should be given to various elements of IBE. In the next section, I will
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describe how the effective SM is different from the SM, and then we shall survey their
IBE qualities, with an eye toward gaining insight along the way.
4 The Standard Model vs. the Effective Standard Model
The SM has a finite number of operators of dimension four or less. The effective SM
(ESM) is the SM but with all possible higher dimensional operators present consistent
with the sacrosanct symmetries of the SM: Lorentz symmetry and SU(3)c×SU(2)L×
U(1)Y gauge symmetries. Thus we can relate the lagrangians of the two by the
equation
LESM = LSM +
∑
n,i
ηi
O
(4+n)
i
Λn
, (1)
where O
(4+n)
i is the collection of all operators of higher dimension 4 + n that respect
the symmetries of the SM and have unknown couplings ηi/Λ
n in front, where Λ is the
cutoff scale and ηi are numerical pre-factors that can be different for each operator.
The SM matches all observed high-energy collider data to excellent compatibility.
There can be no additional operators that would improve the fit by a meaningful
amount. Furthermore, if any of the higher-dimensional operators of LESM become
worrisome with respect to the data, we need merely tune down the strength of the
interaction by making its associated ηn,i coupling smaller, to escape the problem.
Which theory is better, the ESM or SM, given that they both can be made equally
compatible with the data? To answer this question, let us first apply some of the IBE
thinking common in the particle physics community. Our example source for a typical
particle physicist approach to these issues will be the essay written by Nobel Laureate
Burton Richter [9]. We shall also attempt to answer the question using the criteria
of the philosopher Paul Thagard [4], whose paper is still considered one of the key
early expositions on theory choice criteria for IBE.
5 Richter’s IBE Criteria
There are not many official forums through which practicing particle physicists are
encouraged to divulge their IBE criteria. But one forum where it regularly happens,
both in essays and in letters to the editor, is in more informal publications such
as professional society monthly magazines and newsletters. One of the most talked
about articles of this kind in recent years was written by Burton Richter [9]. Richter
6
and Sam Ting won the Nobel prize of physics in 1976 for finding the J/ψ particle,
which was a key discovery in establishing the SM.
Richter has been horrified by what he views are “major problems in the philosophy
behind theory” research. He says,
Simply put, most of what currently passes as the most advanced theory
looks to be more theological speculation, the development of models with
no testable consequences, than it is the development of practical knowl-
edge, the development of models with testable and falsifiable consequences
(Karl Popper’s definition of science).
Richter goes on to say that more weight should be put on
1. theories that have testable and falsifiable consequencies, and
2. theories that simplify rather than increase complication.
Incidentally, he also discusses two anti-criteria that should not be used, which are the
anthropic principle and naturalness. Let us not discuss these anti-criteria, but rather
judge the SM vs. ESM based on what Richter would have us do, on falsifiability and
simplicity.
Regarding falsifiability and testable consequences, an argument can be made that
the SM wins. The ESM has an infinite number of operators with coefficients to
be pinned down by data later, and as such can accommodate more experimental
outcomes than the SM. After all, the ESM reduces to SM when Λn →∞. Thus, the
SM is much more testable and falsifiable than ESM.
Although not central to the subsequent discussion, I would like to remark that fal-
sifiability has never struck me as strong argument for theory deciding for two reasons.
Skepticism toward falsifiability has long been held in the philosophy community, but
let me give what I think are two strong reasons to worry about its applicability. Let’s
take an example of an unfalsifiable theory: Theory X says that obvious fact Y is true
(e.g., emeralds are green, or something trivially true like that), and that angels live
in another universe. We can use this silly theory to illustrate why falsifiability is not
a very solid criteria.
First, the modularity of the theory can be under dispute, such as the more testable
first statement versus the second statement. Second, if things change dramatically
such that what was true yesterday is not true tomorrow (tomorrow Y is false), then
the theory is trivially invalidated. Does that make it falsifiable? In that case, all
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theories are falsifiable by scattering the word “always” through-out its description.
And third, it is never clear if falsifiabilitymust be applicable in principle or in practice.
In principle perhaps everything is testable and falsifiable (e.g., many versions of string
theory – just run a collider at 1019GeV), whereas in practice good theories might not
be (perhaps: string theory, high scale warped extra dimensions, etc.) because of lack
of technology, time, money or manpower to test it.
In short, you can like it, you can hope for it, you can wish for it, you can say it
would make our lives as scientists much easier if so, but it would presumptuous of us
to say that Nature cares one whit if we can falsify a true statement. Nevertheless,
we shall take it seriously because we are investigating somebody else’s criteria, which
happen to be shared by many others. And as we have noted above, the testable and
falsifiability criteria favors SM over ESM.
Regarding simplicity, the SM has a finite number of terms with a finite number of
coefficients, whereas the ESM has an infinite number of terms with an infinite number
of coefficients. No contest, SM wins in the simplicity category.
According to Richter’s two key criteria, falsifiability and simplicity, the SM is the
winner, and we infer it to be the best theory.
6 Thagard’s IBE Criteria
The philosophy literature is vast on the subject. Surveying it with sweeping scope
would not be enlightening and picking just one approach to compare leaves one
wanting. Nevertheless, I will do the latter, choosing a classic paper on the subject by
Paul Thagard [4].
Thagard’s theory choice criteria are
1. Consilience: The measure of how many facts the theory explains; furthermore,
“a consilient theory unifies and systematizes.”
2. Simplicity: The quality of having the fewest “auxiliary hypothesis,” fewest ad
hoc additions, and most ontological economy.
3. Analogy: Shared characteristics between two theories, leads to one theory ad-
mitting a new characteristic if the new characteristic is part of the other theory
and explains the shared characteristics there.
Regarding consilience, it is a draw between SM and ESM. The facts are equally
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compatible in the two theories, and there is no relevant advantage in either in the
realm of unification and systematizing.
Regarding simplicity, although it is not exactly the kind of simplicity that Richter
was talking about, the SM clearly is superior to the ESM in this category. The new
operators of the ESM simply add more.
Regarding analogy, it is my view that the ESM wins out over the SM. I will explain
why twice. First, I will explain it here strictly in the language of Thagard’s analogy
propositions. I will explain it a second time later heuristically using particle physics
language from Steven Weinberg.
As Thagard explains, by analogy he does not mean the standard syllogism
A is P,Q,R, S
B is P,Q,R
Thus, B is S.
No, he means something more causally connected:
A is P,Q,R, S
B is P,Q,R
If S explains P,Q,R in A, then B is S.
I will follow this analogy criteria by first definining
A = chiral lagrangian of pion scattering
B = Effective Standard Model (ESM).
The chiral lagrangian of pion scattering is
Lpi =
v2
4
Tr(∂µU∂
µU †) +
v2
Λ2
[
Tr(∂µU∂
µU †)
]2
+ · · · (2)
where
U ≡ exp(i~τ · ~π/v2). (3)
This lagrangian has an infinite number of terms respecting the underlying SU(2)
custodial symmetries. The pions are the ~π fields in U , and v is the vacuum expectation
breaking of the custodial symmetry SU(2)L×SU(2)R to its SU(2)V vector subgroup.
All the interactions of the pions are contained within these terms. As the energy
increases the higher order terms in the lagrangian become more important, and the
data can be accommodated. This theory was very useful. It was determined that all
the higher order corrections needed to be there, although a deep appreciation of why
was not to come until Ken Wilson’s renormalization breakthroughs years later.
Now, the shared properties P,Q,R of the chiral lagrangian theory of pion scatter-
ing and the ESM are
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P,Q,R = quantum field theory, perturbative expansion theory, all lowest
dimensionality terms allowed by symmetries of the theory are present,
finite number of terms relevant in deep infrared, etc.
and the new characteristic S in theory A is
S = all operators consistent with the symmetries are present
S explains P,Q,R because relevant terms are a subset of “all operators”.
Thus, by Thagard’s analogy we would say that the SM should be augmented by
all possible terms consistent with its symmetries −→ ESM. The argument is further
strengthened later when we catch Weinberg directly using the language of analogy to
support the generalization of effective field theory techniques to the SM.
The result of our analysis based on Thagard’s IBE criteria is SM +1, ESM +1,
and Draw +1. No clear resolution to be found here, although compared to Richter’s
criteria there is more support of the ESM in Thagard’s approach.
7 Non-negotiable attributes of a Best Explanation
What is lacking in our discussion of IBE criteria is a rank ordering of attributes. We
must first ask ourselves what is non-negotiable. Falsifiability is clearly something that
can be haggled over. Simplicity is subject to definitional uncertainty, and furthermore
has no universally accepted claim to preeminence. Naturalness, calculability, unifying
ability, predictivity, etc. are also subject to preeminence doubts.
What is non-negotiable is consistency. A theory shown definitively to be inconsis-
tent does not live another day. It might have its utility, such as Newton’s theory of
gravity for crude approximate calculations, but nobody would ever say it is a better
theory than Einstein’s theory of General Relativity1.
Consistency has two key parts to it. The first is that what can and has been
computed must be consistent with all known observational facts. As Murray Gell-
Mann said about his early graduate student years, “Suddenly, I understood the main
function of the theoretician: not to impress the professors in the front row but to
1The word “better” in this context can induce apoplectic shocks in pedants. To avoid that, by
“better” I wish to say that it is closer to the true, underlying theory, whatever that may mean or
be. I do not wish it to mean “better to calculate a hammer fall on the moon in under three lines for
primary school children”, or any other similar appeal to convenience or simplicity.
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agree with observation [10].” Experimentalists of course would not disagree with this
non-negotiable requirement of observational consistency. If you cannot match the
data what are you doing, they would say?
However, theorists have a more nuanced approach to establishing observational
consistency. They often do not spend the time to investigate all the consequences
of their theories. Others do not want to “mop up” someone else’s theory, so they
are not going to investigate it either. We often get into a situation of a new theory
being proposed that solves one problem, but looks like it might create dozens of
other incompatibilities with the data but nobody wants to be bothered to compute
it. Furthermore, the implications might be extremely difficult to compute.
Sometimes there must be suspended judgment in the competition between excel-
lent theories and observational consequences. Lord Kelvin claimed Darwin’s evolution
ideas could not be right because the sun could not burn long enough to enable long-
term evolution over millions of years that Darwin knew was needed. Darwin rightly
ignored such arguments, deciding to stay on the side of geologists who said the earth
appeared to be millions of years old [11]. Of course we know now that Kelvin made
a bad inference because he did not know about the fusion source of burning within
the sun that could sustain its heat output for billions of years.
A second part to consistency is mathematical consistency. There are numerous
examples in the literature of subtle mathematical consistency issues that need to be
understood in a theory. Massive gauge theories looked inconsistent for years until
the Higgs mechanism was understood. Some gauge theories you can dream up are
“anomalous” and inconsistent. Some forms of string theory are inconsistent unless
there are extra spatial dimensions. Extra time dimensions appear to violate causality,
even when one tries to demand it from the outset, thereby rendering the theory
inconsistent. Theories with ghosts, which may not be obvious upon first inspection,
give negative probabilities of scattering.
Mathematical consistency is subtle and hard at times, and like observational
consistency there is no theorem that says that it can be established to comfortable
levels by theorists on time scales convenient to humans. Sometimes the inconsistency
is too subtle for the scientists to see right off. Other times the calculability of the
mathematical consistency question is too difficult to give definitive answer and it
is a “coin flip” whether the theory is ultimately consistent or not. For example,
pseudomoduli potentials that could cause a runaway problem are incalculable in some
interesting dynamically broken supersymmetric theories [12].
It is not controversial that observational consistency and mathematical consistency
are non-negotiable; however, the due diligence given to them in theory choice is often
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lacking. The establishment of observational consistency or mathematical consistency
can remain in an embryonic state for years while research dollars flow and other IBE
criteria become more motivational factors in research and inquiry, and the consistency
issues become taken for granted.
This is one of the themes of Gerard ‘t Hooft’s essay “Can there be physicst without
experiments?” [13]. He reminds the reader that some of the grandest theories are
investigations of the nature of spacetime at the Planck scale, which is many orders of
magnitude beyond where we currently have direct experimental probes. If this is to
continue as a physics enterprise it “may imply that we should insist on much higher
demands of logical and mathematical rigour than before.” Despite the weakness of
verb tense employed, it is an incontestable point. It is in these Planckian theories,
such as string theory and loop quantum gravity, where the lack of consistency rigor
is so plainly unacceptable. However, the cancer of lax attention to consistency can
spread fast in an environment where theories and theorists are feˆted before vetted.
8 Effective field theories and consistency
Let us begin with the claim at the heart of our discussion. The claim behind
the ascendancy of effective theories is that unless there is good and explicit reason
otherwise, consistency requires that a theory have all possible interactions consistent
with its symmetries at every order.
The claim has its origins in the work of Wilson, whose original review article with
Kogut [14] is a classic. There are many modern reviews of effective theories that make
or assume the above claim [16, 17, 18]. Weinberg’s recent historical perspective [19]
gives an excellent summary of what was learned:
I was struck [at Erice school in 1976] by Kenneth Wilson’s device of “inte-
grating out” short-distance degrees of freedom by introducing a variable
ultraviolet cutoff, with the bare couplings given a cutoff dependence that
guaranteed that physical quantities are cutoff independent. Even if the
underlying theory is renormalizable, once a finite cutoff is introduced it
becomes necessary to introduce every possible interaction, renormalizable
or not, to keep physics strictly cutoff independent.... Indeed, I realized
that even without a cutoff, as long as every term allowed by symmetries
is included in the Lagrangian, there will always be counterterm available
to absorb every possible ultraviolet divergence....
Therefore, consistency of the theory – the absorption of ultraviolet divergences, the
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maintaining of independence of arbitrary ultraviolet scale cutoff, etc. – requires the
introduction of all possible terms allowed by the symmetries.
The issue of consistency then becomes front and center, and the issues of simplicity
and testability fade in importance. From our discussion above we know that without
this important issue of consistency, the effective SM may not win in a theory choice
competition compared to the SM with just its renormalizable operators, since it
worsens the otherwise positive features of simplicity and testability. Therefore, the
establishment of rigorous consistency requirements on the theory were crucial in the
decision.
9 Relation to Thagard’s analogy criterion
I would like to take a quick aside and show that physicists do reason in real-life,
complex theory circumstances through the analogy criterion of Thagard. Indeed, it
is a separate argument for the general applicability of effective theories.
In the same historical review article [19] quoted above, Weinberg shows that
because effective field theory ideas were necessary in chiral dynamics (low-energy
pion scattering), the concept should also apply to the SM. Here is a relevant quote:
Perhaps the most important lesson from chiral dynamics was that we
should keep an open mind about renormalizability. The renormalizable
Standard Model of elementary particles may itself be just the first term
in an effective field theory that contains every possible interaction allowed
by Lorentz invariance and the SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1) gauge symmetry,
only with the non-renormalizalbe terms suppressed by negative powers of
some very large mass M , just as the terms in chiral dymamics with more
derivatives ... are suppressed by negative powers of 2πFpi ≃ mN .
One should note the usage of analogy language: “most important lesson from chiral
dynamics” and “just as in the terms in chiral dynamics”. Thus, the syllogistic
representations given in sec. 6 are shown to apply and be part of theory choice for
particle physicists.
10 Summary: the preeminence of consistency
I will conclude by stating my two central points that generalize the discussion we
have had above in comparing the effective SM with the SM.
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My first point is that the conditions of theory choice should be ordered. Frequently
we see the listing of criteria for theory choice given in a flat manner, where one is not
given precedence over the other a priori. We see consilience, simplicity, falsifiability,
naturalness, consistency, economy, all together in an unordered list of factors when
judging a theory. However, consistency must take precedence over any other fac-
tors. Observational consistency is obviously central to everyone, most especially our
experimental colleagues, when judging the relevance of theory for describing nature.
Despite some subtleties that can be present with regards to observational consistency2
it is a criterion that all would say is at the top of the list.
Mathematical consistency, on the other hand, is not as fully appreciated. In
Richter’s essay excoriating theorists, he did not appear to recognize or acknowl-
edge the central role that mathematical consistency plays in developing and vetting
theories. Mathematical consistency has a preeminent role right up there with ob-
servational consistency, and can be just as subtle, time-consuming and difficult to
establish. We have seen that in the case of effective theories it trumps other theory
choice considerations such as simpleness, predictivity, testability, etc.
My second point builds on the first. Since consistency is preeminent, it must have
highest priority of establishment compared to other conditions. Deep, thoughtful
reflection and work to establish the underlying self-consistency of a theory takes
precedence over finding ways to make it more natural or to have less parameters (i.e.,
simple). Highest priority must equally go into understanding all of its observational
implications. A theory should not be able to get away with being fuzzy on either
of these two counts, before the higher order issues of simplicity and naturalness and
economy take center stage. That this effort might take considerable time and effort
should not be correlated with a theory’s value, just as it is not a theory’s fault if it
takes humans decades to build a collider to sufficiently high energy and luminosity to
test it.
Additionally, dedicated effort on mathematical consistency of the theory, or class
of theories, can have enormous payoffs in helping us understand and interpret the
implications of various theory proposals and data in broad terms. An excellent
example of that in recent years is by Adams et al. [15], who showed that some theories
in the infrared with a cutoff cannot be self-consistently embedded in an ultraviolet
complete theory without violating standard assumptions regarding superluminality
or causality. The temptation can be high to start manipulating uninteresting theories
2There can be circumstances where a theory is observationally consistent in a vast number of
observables, but in a few it does not get right, yet no other decent theory is around to replace it.
In other words, observational consistency is still the top criterion, but the best theory may not be
100% consistent.
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into simpler and more beautiful versions before due diligence is applied to determine
if they are sick at their cores. This should not be rewarded.
11 Implications for the LHC and beyond
Finally, I would like to make a comment about the implications of this discussion for
the LHC and other colliders that may come in the future. First, it is obvious that we
must be prepared for and search for higher-dimensional operators in the effective SM
that go beyond the operators of the SM. This is indeed happening at the LHC, and
first indications of new physics may very well come from small perturbations in SM
observables due to the subtle effects of these suppressed operators.
However, there is broader point to be made regarding implications for colliders.
In the years since the charm quark was discovered in the mid 1970’s there has been
tremendous progress experimentally and important new discoveries, including the
recent discovery of a Higgs boson-like state [20], but no dramatic new discovery that
can put us on a straight and narrow path beyond the SM. That may change soon
at the LHC. Nevertheless, it is expensive in time and money to build higher energy
colliders, our main reliable transporter into the high energy frontier. This limits the
prospects for fast experimental progress.
In the meantime though, hundreds of theories have been born and have died. Some
have died due to incompatibility of new data (e.g., simplistic technicolor theories, or
simpleminded no-scale supersymmetry theories), but others have died under their
own self-consistency problems (e.g., some extra-dimensional models, some string
phenomenology models, etc.). In both cases, it was care in establishing consistency
with past data and mathematical rigor that have doomed them. In that sense,
progress is made. Models come to the fore and fall under the spotlight or survive.
When attempting to really explain everything, the consistency issues are stretched
to the maximum. For example, it is not fully appreciated in the supersymmetry
community that it may even be difficult to find a “natural” supersymmetric model
that has a high enough reheat temperature to enable baryogenesis without causing
problems elsewhere [21]. There are many examples of ideas falling apart when they
are pushed very hard to stand up to the full body of evidence of what we already
know.
Relatively speaking, theoretical research is inexpensive. It is natural that a shift
develop in fundamental science. The code of values in theoretical research will likely
alter in time, as experimental input slows. Ideas will be pursued more rigorously
and analysed crtically. Great ideas will always be welcome. However, soft model
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building tweaks for simplicity and naturalness will become less valuable than rigorous
tests of mathematical consistency. Distant future experimental implications identified
for theories not fully vetted will become less valuable than rigorous computations of
observational consistency across the board of all currently known data. One can hope
that unsparing devotion to full consistency, both observational and mathematical, will
be the hallmarks of the future era.
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